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Abstract 
A large variety of security tools exist for Smartphones, to help their owners to secure the 
phones and prevent unauthorised others from accessing their data and services. These range 
from screen locks to antivirus software to password managers. Yet many Smartphone owners 
do not use these tools despite their being free and easy to use. We were interested in exploring 
this apparent anomaly. A number of researchers have applied existing models of behaviour 
from other disciplines to try to understand these kinds of behaviours in a security context, and 
a great deal of research has examined adoption of screen locking mechanisms. We review the 
proposed models and consider how they might fail to describe adoption behaviours. We then 
present the Integrated Model of Behaviour Prediction (IMBP), a richer model than the ones 
tested thus far. We consider the kinds of factors that could be incorporated into this model in 
order to understand Smartphone owner adoption, or rejection, of security tools. The model 
seems promising, based on existing literature, and we plan to test its efficacy in future studies. 
Keywords 
Smartphone security, Integrated Model of Behaviour Prediction, Security Tool 
Adoption  
1. Introduction 
People rely on their devices to store personal photos and make online purchases, and 
many have migrated such usage to their mobile devices. Digital interactions often 
require users to prove their identity and this generally requires provision of a 
password.  People thus need to remember far more passwords than they reasonably 
can. To cope, many choose weak passwords, reuse the same password for all 
accesses or write them down (Adams & Sasse, 1999).  
 
Password managers exist to ease the password memorial load and encourage the use 
of stronger passwords. However, surveys reveal that few users use password 
managers on their Smartphones. This reluctance applies to many security tools, not 
only password managers. For example, a survey of 1,656 smartphone users 
(Consumer Reports, 2012) revealed that although the Smartphone holds sensitive 
data, 64% of users did not lock their phones and 39% did not use any security 
measures.  
 
The security measures that Smartphone owners ought to use include screen locks, 
patching of OS, anti-virus and anti-malware software, firewalls, anti-theft 
mechanisms, encryption and password managers (Parker et al., 2011)(Jeon et al., 
2011). 
 
In order to test how widespread password manager usage was we ran a crowd-
sourced poll of 100 people via CrowdFlower. We asked firstly whether people used a 
Password Manager Application. 29 people did, 46 did not, and the rest did not know 
what such an application was. For those in the latter group, we explained what a 
password manager was, and asked them whether they thought it might be useful. 13 
of the 29 said yes. Among those who used a password manager, only 8 used it on 
their smartphones.  
 
Poor usability has often been blamed for non-adoption of security measures (Furnell, 
2005) (Adams & Sasse, 1999). However, even usable techniques, such as biometric 
authentication, have not enjoyed widespread adoption. A survey of iPhone users in 
Saudi Arabia (Aldaraiseh et al. ,2015) found that even though the majority of 
respondents agreed that TouchID was usable and secure, only 33% actually used it 
for securing their devices.  
 
It would be helpful to model decision-making in a way that reflects factors that deter 
or encourage adoption in order to design interventions that are more likely to be 
adopted.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Eisenhart (Eisenhart, 1991, p. 205) defines a theoretical framework as a “structure 
that guides research by relying on a formal theory; that is, the framework is 
constructed by using an established, coherent explanation of certain phenomena and 
relationships”. The value of using a theoretical framework in a study lies in its 
ability to organize and focus the study and thus strengthen the research. Theory-
based studies specify which key variables or factors influence a phenomenon of 
interest (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2015). Distinct theories address different units of 
practice so it is important to choose a suitable framework. The selection of the best-
fit theoretical framework starts by identifying the problem, goal, and units of practice 
(Sussman & Sussman, 2001), not because a theory is in vogue, familiar or 
interesting.  
Four behavioural theories have been used in the field of information system security 
in order to model security-related end-user behaviour (Lebek et al., 2014).  They are 
General Deterrence Theory (Gibbs, 1975), Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) 
(Aizen, 1991), Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) and Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975).  One that has not yet been used in this 
area is the Integrated Model of Behaviour Prediction (IMBP) (Fishbein , 2000) 
(Fishbein & Yzer, 2003), a relatively recent theory that is quite similar to TPB but 
with some improvements. Table 1 provides an overview of these models, depicting 
the factors they incorporate, and critiques each model. 
 
Table 1 An overview of selected theoretical models 
Model Factors Influencing 
Behaviour 
Critique Security-
related 
Studies  
General 
Deterrence 
Theory 
(GDT) 
Fear of consequences Evidence that consequences, 
on their own, do not inform 
behaviour 
Chen & Li, 
2014 
 
Theory of 
Planned 
Behaviour 
(TPB) 
Attitude, subjective 
norms, and perceived 
behavioural control 
Assumption that intention 
infallibly leads to behaviour. 
Does not model the impact of 
external factors 
Ngoqo & 
Flowerday, 
2015 
Technology 
Acceptance 
Model 
(TAM) 
Perceived 
usefulness and ease-
of-use 
Too Technology oriented. 
Does not consider the 
psychological motivations of 
end users 
 
Ignores influence of norms 
and self-efficacy and 
individual characteristics 
Hsu et al., 
2011  
Protection 
Motivation 
Theory 
(PMT) 
Threat appraisal: 
(perceived severity, 
perceived 
vulnerability) and 
coping appraisal: 
(perceived self-
efficacy, perceived 
response efficacy) 
Assumes rationality of 
behaviour and that their 
adoption of certain behaviour 
can be motivated by fear 
Gundu & 
Flowerday, 
2012 
Integrated 
Model of 
Behaviour 
Prediction 
(IMBP) 
Intention, skills, 
environmental factors,  
beliefs, attitudes, 
perceived normative 
pressure(subjective 
and descriptive norms) 
and self- efficacy 
Acknowledges irrationality of 
human behaviour 
 
 
The first four models seem rather simplistic to describe human behaviour, and, 
except for TPB, rely on rationality of human behaviour, which is bound to make a 
model lack predictive power. The IMBP model might be the only model rich enough 
to come close to describing human decision-making in the security context and to be 
helpful in understanding adoption or rejection of security tools.  
3. Applying IMBP in the Smartphone Security Domain 
Smartphone security behaviour involves the adoption of security tools such as screen 
lock, the awareness of security threats, and other security-related practices such as 
granting excessive permissions to an application. Behaviours can be categorized as 
either positive or negative behaviours. Positive security behaviours are behaviours of 
commission such as choosing strong passwords or the use of anti-virus applications. 
Negative behaviours imply omission: not ‘jailbreaking’ a phone or not granting 
excessive permissions to applications. All behaviours seek to prolong the device life 
span and to prevent any unwanted situations.  
It is common practice by academic researchers to borrow theories from other 
domains. The healthcare domain provides many theories that seek to model human 
health behaviours, for example, Protection Motivation Theory and the Health Belief 
Model. These theories were developed to understand health behaviour such as 
exercising, following healthy diet and using protection and hygiene products in order 
to prevent diseases. There are similarities between health and security behaviours. 
Both are trying to avoid unwanted situations and the adoption of these behaviours 
resulted in avoidance of diseases or security incidents. Therefore, it seems promising 
to use one of these theories to understand smartphone security behaviour. IMBP was 
developed in 2000 based on the Health Beliefs Model, the Theory of Reasoned 
Action and Social Cognitive Theory. All of these three theories have been tested in 
the computer security domain; therefore, this model’s foundations have thus been 
tested. This model suggests three determinants of someone’s intention to engage in a 
behaviour. These three variables, also called ‘proximal variables’, are: attitude, 
perceived norm and self-efficacy. Also, this model considered other ‘distal’ or 
background variables, which play an indirect role in influencing the behaviour and 
they are mediated by the proximal variables (Fishbein & Yzer, 2003). Although the 
distal variables that can be considered are specified in the model (Fishbein, 2000), 
the number of variables is virtually unlimited (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). 
Since IMBP is a relatively new model its validity has not been widely tested, and 
such testing as has been carried out has mostly been in the health or education 
domains (Robbins & Niederdeppe, 2015) (Kreijns et al., 2013). Because this model 
has not been tested in the field of human-centred security, this section will consider 
the factors that should be incorporated in order to model smartphone security 
behaviours.  
The distal variables in this model include demographic variables, such as age, gender 
and culture, personality trait, moods, media exposure and other individual 
differences (e.g. perceived risk) (Fishbein & Yzer, 2003). Except for media 
exposure, all these factors are individual characteristics. However, since these factors 
can be extended in the model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011), the existing human-centric 
literature suggests other variables that might play an important role in smartphone 
users reluctant to adopt security-related behaviours, for example. In order to isolate 
the factors that have been shown to have an effect on smartphone users security 
decisions, related work in human-centric studies in the smartphone security domain 
are briefly reviewed:  
Gender. Skog (2002) has reported a big difference between males and females in 
their attitudes to their smartphones. While males emphasised the functional features, 
females paid more attention to the appearance thereof. Barn et al., (2014) found that 
male students were less cautious about their privacy than female students. They were 
also more likely to share their personal data and contact details with other 
applications and to shop online using their phones.  
 
Shared devices. Karlson et al, (2009) and Hang et al, (2012) shed light on the role of 
sharing on adopting security measures. As most of the current authentication 
systems, such as the screen lock mechanism, follow an “all-or-nothing” approach; 
they reported on the privacy concerns of smartphone users sharing their devices with 
others.  
 
Privacy concerns. 208 Android users were asked about their privacy concerns  (Felt 
et al., 2012). They claimed they had aborted the installation of an application at least 
once due to excessive permission requests. This highlights the impact of privacy 
concerns on smartphone users’ security decisions.  
 
Context. Researchers found a correlation between smartphone locking behaviour and 
context of use.  Harbach et al., (2014) performed a real-life field study to investigate 
unlocking behaviours of smartphone users by using an application that automatically 
logged locking activities of 52 Android smartphone users for a month. They found 
that users spent up to 9% of the overall device usage time interacting with the unlock 
screen and, in about 1/4 of smartphone usage situations, owners considered the 
locking screen to be unnecessary. Moreover, this study found that even those who 
did lock their devices considered it unnecessary when in private locations. They 
suggested implementation of context-dependent locking.  
 
Egelman et al., (2014) replicated the study done by (Harbach et al., 2014) but with 
some modifications to complement the findings. Their study investigated several 
threat models by comparing participants’ perceptions of the sensitivity of the stored 
data on their devices. Based on an experimental investigation, they suggested design 
guidelines to help improve smartphone unlocking adoption. Although the Harbach et 
al. study reported the superfluity of unlocking in private, the latter study found that 
1/4 of the participants enabled locking to protect their data specifically from family 
and friends. Thus, they suggested that personal preferences be considered when 
designing locking mechanisms.  
 
These studies reveal that smartphone users have differing preferences with respect to 
their decisions to secure their Smartphones in different contexts. Since security 
measures are mostly designed with fixed features for all smartphone users, they do 
not fit in with individual users’ preferences and this mismatch might well lead to 
non-adoption. For example, most unlocking functions protect all the data in the 
mobile devices except perhaps use of the camera. Some users might prefer to release 
other applications from the need for authentication too. The current atomicity of 
locking might discourage use of the locking mechanism altogether.  
 
Personality. In their study into using message-based interventions to change the 
screen lock behaviour of smartphone users (Van Bruggen et al., 2013) researchers 
collected personality data based on the “Big Five” personality traits and could not 
find any significant correlation between personality traits and the success of 
interventions except from a very small impact of “agreeableness” in terms of 
responding to the intervention. 
 
Device Operating System. Some studies (Ophoff & Robinson, 2014) (Benenson et 
al., 2013) examined differences in user security behaviours on different mobile 
platforms; particularly between Android and iOS. It was found that Android users 
were more likely to install security applications such as virus scanners, as compared 
to IOS users. However, it was not clear that this was due to increased awareness 
levels or because of their confidence in Apple to protect their phones (Benenson et 
al., 2013) (Mylonas et al., 2013). 
 
Morality. Van Bruggen et al., (2013) studied the adoption of Smartphone security 
behaviours, focusing on screen lock behaviour. They conducted an observation study 
on 149 Android users over period of five months to explore the baseline usage of 
security measures by smartphone users and to study the ability of message 
interventions to change security behaviour. They designed three types of intervention 
message: morality, deterrence and incentives and found that messages based on 
morality did have some impact on user behaviour. 
 
Ethnicity. Barn et al., (2014) found a major difference in the levels of awareness of 
smartphone information security among users of different ethnic backgrounds. Users 
with a white ethnic background tended to be less concerned about data security than 
those from Black or Asian background. 
 
Peer effect. Van Bruggen et al., (2013) reported a peer effect impact on screen 
locking behaviour, as a response to an intervention message. Those participants who 
changed their security behaviour as a consequence of the intervention were highly 
likely to have face-to-face contact with other participants who also changed their 
behaviours.  
 
Technical skills. Users’ technical skills affected their security-related adoption 
decisions on smartphones. Users who enabled encryption, remote data wipe, and 
remote device locator tended to be more technically savvy (Ophoff & Robinson, 
2014). 
 
Faulty or Incomplete Mental Models. Benenson et al., (2012) conducted the first 
study into the role of users in the security of smartphone devices. They used semi-
structured interviews to investigate user attitudes to smartphone security. They 
concluded that faulty or incomplete mental models played a significant role in 
impacting users’ security behaviours. 
 
We have incorporated these factors into the IMBP model, depicted in Figure 1. The 
background variables in the model reflect factors that emerged from the literature. 
Most of these variables emerged from studies of the adoption of the Smartphone 
screen lock mechanism. Other studies considered mobile security practice in general. 
Some considered the omission of security behaviours, such as the adoption of other 
security measures, while yet others addressed the commission of insecure 
behaviours, such as people unthinkingly granting excessive permissions. Some 
literature examined these variables for smartphone’ users personal usage while others 
use them to study employee security behaviours. The majority of these studies were 
conducted on university students, even though the aims of these studies were to 
understand smartphone usage in general. Few studies focused on the security 
behaviours of a particular population such as older people. 
 
Figure 1 Applying IMBP to Smartphone Security  
4. Discussion  
This section discusses how well the model proposed in Figure 1 reflects smartphone 
security usage.  
Background factors can be divided into three classes: individual, environmental and 
vendor variables. The first represents factors associated with the each individual user 
and they can be divided into two sections: controlled and uncontrolled variables. 
Uncontrolled variables are fixed features that users cannot change such as ethnicity, 
gender, age and personality. Studying these variables within the smartphone security 
domain can help in designing personalized security mechanisms or can help 
employers to design effective security policies. The controlled variables can be 
influenced by interventions such as morality, for example. The environmental 
category represents variables that can be impacted by the environment the user is 
interacting with. This includes peer influence or context of use. The final category is 
associated with the vendor of the device or the developer of a certain application 
such as the Operating System.  
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5. Conclusion 
Freely available security tools and measures are not ubiquitously used by smartphone 
owners. We wanted to model security behaviours in order to understand adoption or 
rejection of these tools. The IMBP model appears to be the best model for reflecting 
a number of important factors informing smartphone security intentions. We tested 
the applicability this model by reviewing the research literature, and found it a 
promising match. Since this model has not yet been tested in human-centred security, 
future work will seek to validate the model with Smartphone owners.  
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